Denver Law Review
Volume 62

Issue 3

Article 10

January 1985

People v. Mitchell: The Good Faith Exception in Colorado
Denise W. Kennedy

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Denise W. Kennedy, People v. Mitchell: The Good Faith Exception in Colorado, 62 Denv. U. L. Rev. 841
(1985).

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

PEOPLE V. MITCHELL: THE GOOD FArrH EXCEPTION
IN COLORADO
INTRODUCTION

In People v. Mitchell,' the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's suppression of evidence seized in the course of executing an
arrest warrant later held invalid. Relying on Whiteley v. Warden,2 the
court held that the arrest warrant was void and could not support a
search incident to the arrest. Of greater interest and contrary to the
state's assertion, the court found that the facts in the case did not warrant application of the Colorado statutory good faith exception to the
3
exclusionary rule.
I. BACKGROUND
The recently enacted good faith statute is Colorado's response to a
national trend toward limiting the exclusionary remedy to those situations in which the police officer seizing the evidence has reason to believe he is violating the fourth amendment. Despite its proponents'
claims that only the remedy is affected, an analysis of the exclusionary
rule's constitutional basis reveals the dangers posed by the good faith
exception to well-established fourth amendment principles.
A.

Development of the Exclusionary Rule

Although Weeks v. United States4 is often cited as the seminal exclusionary rule case, Weeks was only one of several early Supreme Court
cases that developed the exclusionary remedy for fourth amendment violations. In Boyd v. United States,5 decided before Weeks, the Supreme
Court excluded evidence "seized" pursuant to a government subpoena
because the subpoena violated defendant's fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination. In Weeks, the Court excluded evidence seized
in an illegal search and held that exclusion of wrongfully seized evidence
from federal court proceedings was required by the Constitution 6 and
1. 678 P.2d 990 (Colo. 1984).
2. 401 U.S. 560 (1971). In that case, the United States Supreme Court suppressed
evidence seized in a search incident to an arrest because the arrest warrant was issued
based on an insufficient affidavit of probable cause.
3. COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-3-308 (Supp. 1984).
4. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
6. The Court in Weeks held the exclusionary rule to be constitutionally required:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value,
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution.
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
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by considerations of judicial integrity. 7
It was not until 1949 that the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether the fourth amendment, including the exclusionary rule, also applied to state courts. 8 In a departure from its earlier stated constitutional basis for the exclusionary rule, the Court separated the right from
the remedy and held that although states were compelled to observe
fourth amendment rights through the fourteenth amendment, they were
free to develop alternative remedies for fourth amendment violations. 9
Twelve years later in Mapp v. Ohio,' 0 the Court overruled its decision in
Wolf and held that state courts were obliged to exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence. II Thus, at the time of the Mapp decision, the exclusionary rule had become an inseparable element of the fourth
amendment. It was not long, however, before the attack began.
B.

The Deterrence Rationale

While much of the Court's opinion in Mapp was grounded in concerns for the preservation of judicial integrity 12 and in the need to ensure that victims of fourth amendment violations were accorded a
meaningful remedy,' 3 subsequent Court decisions have significantly
eroded Mapp by limiting the holding to a narrow concept of deterring
police misconduct. 14 In effect, the deterrence rationale has replaced the
judicial integrity rationale that was of paramount importance to the
court in Mapp as the primary, if not sole, rationale for invoking the exclusionary rule. 15
7. The Court was also concerned with the integrity of the courts:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures ... should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the
maintenance of such fundamental rights.
Id at 392.
8. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
9. Id at 31.

10. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11. The issue of whether Wolf v. Colorado should be overruled and the exclusionary
rule applied to the states was not argued at the state court level by the defendant. Rather,
it was first raised in an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court. Id at 646 n.3.
12. The Court warned that "[nlothing can destroy a government more quickly than its
failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."
Id at 659.
13. Referring to the application of the fourth amendment to the states in Wolf, the
Court held that "we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise." Id at

660.
14. While critics of the exclusionary rule have narrowed the concept of deterrence to
the behavior of the individual police officer at the time he or she is committing the fourth
amendment violation, proponents of the exclusionary rule argue that the deterrent rationale is valid only if it encompasses a system-wide deterrence achieved by the knowledge that
all evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment will be excluded. See Ashdown,
Good Faith, The Exclusionary Remedy, and Rule Oriented Adjudication in the Criminal Process, 24
WM. & MARY L. Rv. 335, 339 n.14 (1983); Ingber, Dending The Citadek The Dangerous
Attack of "Reasonable Good Faith", 36 VAND. L. Rv. 1511, 1542-44 (1983); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulatingthe Police and Derailing
the Law, 70 GEO. LJ. 365, 431-32 (1981).
15. It is felt by some that, for all practical purposes, the judicial integrity rationale has
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The substitution of the deterrence rationale has resulted in the
Court admitting evidence despite fourth amendment violations in those
instances where it has felt that suppression of the evidence would not
deter future unlawful police conduct. 16 Thus, for example, unlawfully
obtained evidence is admissible in grand jury proceedings, 17 in federal
civil proceedings,' 8 to impeach defendant's testimony at trial, 19 when
seized pursuant to a statute that is later declared unconstitutional,2 0 and
when it is used against someone other than the person whose fourth
21
amendment rights were violated.
Closely connected to the emergence of the deterrence rationale is
the Court's use of a balancing test to determine whether the exclusionary rule should be invoked in cases of police misconduct. The exclusionary remedy is now available when there is a violation of fourth
amendment rights and when, in the Court's judgment, the benefits of
increased deterrence outweigh the costs of freeing criminals.2 2 In this
way, the Court has significantly limited the application of the exclusionary remedy, leaving in doubt the degree to which the exclusionary rule is
23
perceived as a constitutionally required remedy.
C.

The Good Faith Exception

The latest effort to restrict the exclusionary rule is the reasonable
good faith exception. Proponents of this exception argue that the deterrence goal is not furthered when a police officer, acting in good faith,
does not know he is violating the fourth amendment. 24 Appended to
been abandoned. See Ashdown, supra note 14, at 338; Jensen and Hart, The Good Faith
Restatement of the Exclusionary Rule, 73J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 916, 918 (1982). But see
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968), in which the Courts warned that "[clourts which sit
under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of
such invasions."
16. But see United States v.Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982), which retroactively applied
the holding in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), that police must obtain a search
warrant before entering a suspect's home to make an arrest. In rejecting the government's
argument that retroactive application would not serve the purposes of the exclusionary
rule, the Court explained that "[i]f, as the Government argues, all rulings resolving unsetded Fourth Amendment questions should be nonretroactive, then, in close cases, law enforcement officials would have little incentive to err on the side of constitutional
behavior." Johnson, 457 U.S. at 561 (footnote omitted).
17. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
18. United States v.Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
19. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
20. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
21. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
22. In all the cases cited supra notes 17-21, the Court applied the balancing test and
held that the benefits could not justify the costs of suppressing the evidence.
23. In a recent law review article, former Supreme Court Justice Stewart explored the
basis of the exclusionary rule and concluded that the exclusionary rule is a remedy required by the fourth amendment. For further development of this theory, as well as
others, see Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond- The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1380-89
(1983).
24. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3419 (1984); United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 531, 542 (1975). It has been suggested by many that the solution does not lie in
further limiting of the exclusionary rule, but rather in creating so-called "bright lines"
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this subjective standard is the objective requirement that such ignorance
be reasonable. Due in part to the primacy of the deterrence rationale
and the balancing test, and in part because of the growing realization
among criminal justice experts that the Court opinions which form
much of fourth amendment law are unclear and difficult to apply, 2 5 the
good faith exception has become a major topic in fourth amendment
law.
Although the exact origins of the good faith exception are unclear, 26 the reasonable good faith exception first received national attention as a result of Justice White's dissent in Stone v. Powell.2 7 He
suggested that the time had come to modify the exclusionary rule by
incorporating therein a two-pronged subjective/objective good faith
standard. In Justice White's view, a police officer should first have to
show a good faith belief that his conduct was in accordance with the
law. 28 He should next be obligated to show reasonable grounds to support that belief.2 9 Thus, if the officer knew or should have known that
the search was unconstitutional under the fourth amendment, the exclusionary rule would result in suppression of the evidence.
Four years later, in United States v. Williams,30 considered the
landmark case on the good faith exception, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals adopted a reasonable good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule in an alternate disposition of the case. Explaining that no deterrence would be achieved by suppression and that the costs to society
could not justify the benefits where a good faith error was made, 3 ' the
Fifth Circuit became the first federal court to adopt the good faith
exception.
Although there was some expression of support among the
Supreme Court justices for the good faith exception, 3 2 it took some time
for those favoring the exception to gather the necessary majority. In
which are clear-cut guidelines articulating permissible investigatory practices. In this way,
a police officer who has violated the fourth amendment cannot be said to have done so in
good faith if his behavior lay outside those practices declared permissible. For greater
development of this theory, see LaFave, "Case-by-CaseAdjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures'" The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 127.
25. Jensen & Hart, supra note 15, at 924-28. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 490-91 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
26. In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974), the Court observed that
"[w]here the official action was pursued in complete good faith,. . . the deterrence rationale loses much of its force." Given the Court's predilection for not invoking the exclusionary rule where police deterrence is deemed unlikely (see supra notes 17-21 and
accompanying text) this observation by the Court in Tucker created the necessary basis for
a good faith exception.
27. 428 U.S. 465, 536 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
28. Id at 538.
29. Id
30. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
31. "Mhe exclusionary rule exists to deter willful or flagrant actions by police, not
reasonable, good-faith ones. Where the reason for the rule ceases, its application must
cease also. The costs to society of applying the rule beyond the purposes it exists to serve
are simply too high .......
Idl at 840.
32. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983) (White, J., concurring); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. at 501-02 (Burger, C.J., concurring); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611-
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1982, after hearing oral arguments on the fourth amendment violation
at issue in Illinois v. Gates,3 3 the Supreme Court set the case for reargument on the issue of whether a reasonable, good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule should be adopted.3 4 The Court subsequently opted,
however, to decide the case on other grounds because the good faith
35
issue had not been raised at the state court level.
Finally, in United States v. Leon, 3 6 the Supreme Court adopted a reasonable good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.3 7 Beginning with
the premise that the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally required,
and by following the deterrent rationale and balancing test approaches,
the Court determined that an analysis of the costs and benefits of excluding evidence seized by officers relying in good faith on a warrant
"leads to the conclusion that such evidence should be admissible in the
38
prosecution's case-in-chief."
In applying the good faith exception rule, the Court indicated that
courts should focus upon the objective reasonableness of the officer's
conduct, rather than upon the officer's subjective good faith. 3 9 The
Court ruled that each trial court must decide whether its good faith analysis will follow an inquiry into the fourth amendment violation pleaded
in the case. 40 While it remains for future courts to interpret the extent to
which the good faith exception of Leon will apply, it is already apparent
rule, the
that by adopting the good faith exception to the exclusionary
41
Court has reduced the protection of the fourth amendment.
II.

FACTS

The relevant facts in People v. Mitchell42 were undisputed. The defendant was stopped by a Greenwood Village police officer for speeding.
12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 542 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.).
33. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
34. Gates, 459 U.S. 1028 (1982) (mem.).
35. Gates, 462 U.S. at 217.
36. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
37. On that same day, the Court applied the Leon good faith exception to a companion
case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984), in which the search warrant had
been held invalid for failure to identify with particularity the items for which the police
were searching.
38. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3416.
39. In opting for an objective standard, the Court quoted from Justice White's concurring opinion in Gates: "Grounding the modification in objective reasonableness, however, retains the value of the exclusionary rule as an incentive for the law enforcement
profession as a whole to conduct themselves in accord with the Fourth Amendment." let
at 3420 n.20 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 261 n.15 (White, J., concurring)).
40. 104 S. Ct. at 3422-23. One wonders what will happen to the development of
fourth amendment law if courts are free to apply an exception to the remedy for a fourth
amendment violation, without ever deciding that a violation has occurred. See Ashdown,
supra note 14, at 343.
41. Justice Brennan expressed the fears of many by lamenting that "in case after case,
I have witnessed the Court's gradual but determined strangulation of the rule. It now
appears that the Court's victory over the Fourth Amendment is complete." 104 S. Ct. at
3430 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
42. 678 P.2d 990 (Colo. 1984).
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Following established procedure, the officer took defendant's driver's
license and radioed the police station to determine whether there were
any outstanding arrest warrants for defendant. Upon searching the
computer files, the dispatcher determined that a Greenwood Village
arrest warrant had been issued in defendant's name for failure to pay a
traffic fine. This information was confirmed by the dispatcher's manual
43
check of the warrant files.
On the basis of this information, the officer arrested the defendant
and transported him to the Greenwood Village police station. During a
search of the defendant, a small vial was discovered in his pocket and
seized. An analysis revealed that the vial contained cocaine, and the defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance. 4 4 After
the search, it was discovered that the original arrest warrant had been
issued in error; prior to the issuance of the arrest warrant the defendant
had paid the traffic fine. 4 5 Upon this discovery, the defendant filed a
motion to suppress the evidence seized from the search incident to his
46
arrest.
At the suppression hearing the state agreed that the defendant had
"timely paid the traffic fine" and that the arrest warrant had been erroneously issued. 4 7 The district court granted the defendant's motion to
suppress since the defendant had been arrested pursuant to a void warrant. From that ruling the state took an interlocutory appeal to the state
supreme court alleging that the Colorado good faith statute48 was applicable to the case and that the district court erred in not applying that
statute to what the state alleged had been a "good faith mistake" or
"technical violation" on the part of the arresting officer.
III.

A.

INSTANT CASE

Majority Opinion
The Colorado Supreme Court's resolution of two issues in Mitchell

43. Id. at 991.
44. Id. at 992. See CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 12-22-310(l)(a)(v), 18-18-105(1)(a) (Supp.
1984).
45. Justice Rovira, in his dissenting opinion, raises the question of whether the traffic
fine was, in fact, paid prior to the issuance of the warrant, and states that the record is
unclear on that point. Mitchell, 678 P.2d at 999 n.2 (RoviraJ., dissenting). He concludes
that such a determination is irrelevant. lId However, that issue is of major importance. It
was Mitchell's paying of the fine prior to the issuance of the warrant that rendered the
warrant void for lack of any facts supporting its issuance. lId at 992 n.2. The record is not
ambiguous as to which event occurred first, the payment of the fine or the issuance of the
warrant, id, and both parties agreed in their briefs to the Colorado Supreme Court that
the traffic fine was timely paid, and that the arrest warrant had been issued in error. See
Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening Brief at 2, People v. Mitchell, 678 P.2d 990 (Colo. 1984);
Answer Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 2, People v. Mitchell, 678 P.2d 990 (Colo. 1984).
46. 678 P.2d at 992.
47. Itd
48. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-3-308 (Supp. 1984). In pertinent part, that statute provides "[e]vidence which is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding shall not be suppressed by the trial court if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a peace
officer. . . as a result of a good faith mistake or of a technical violation."
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summarily foreclosed the state's argument that the district court had
erred in suppressing the evidence. Thus, the court affirmed the district
court's ruling.
1.

Constitutional Standards

The first issue addressed by the court was whether the arrest violated the fourth amendment as an unlawful seizure of a person.4 9 Relying exclusively on the United States Supreme Court decision in Whiteley
v. Warden,50 the Colorado court concluded that the suppression of evidence under the facts in Whiteley required a similar result in the instant
case. The Whiteley decision concerned an arrest warrant issued on the
basis of a conclusory complaint that did not provide support for probable cause. 5 1 A radio bulletin was issued announcing the warrant and an
officer in another part of the state, relying on the bulletin, arrested
Whiteley.
In the course of a search incident to the arrest, burglary tools and
items taken in the burglary were seized. In addition to finding that the
information acquired by the arresting officer was not corroborative of
the fact that Whiteley had committed the crime, the Court rejected the
state's argument that the police bulletin itself constituted the requisite
probable cause for the arrest. 5 2 Contrary to the state's suggestion, the
arrest warrant was fatally deficient from its inception, and the fact that
other officers had no choice but to rely on it could not make constitu53
tionally valid that which was unconstitutional.
Following Whiteley, the court in Mitchell found unpersuasive the fact
that the arresting officer was required to arrest Mitchell based on the
information relayed to him by the dispatcher. An arrest warrant issued
49. The Colorado Constitution has a provision identical to the fourth amendment,
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7, and it also was deemed violated by the arrest here. Mitchell, 678
P.2d at 996.

50. 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
51. Id at 565.
In Whiteley, the Court noted that "[t]he actual basis for Sheriff Ogburn's conclusion
was an informer's tip, but that fact, as well as every other operative fact, is omitted from
the complaint." Id. Although the determination of whether probable cause exists in a
particular situation is fraught with uncertainty, the definition of probable cause is wellsettled. Probable cause to arrest exists when the officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances from reasonably trustworthy information and those facts and circumstances
are sufficient in themselves to warrant in a man of reasonable caution the belief that the
accused has committed an offense or is committing an offense. E.g. McCray v. Illinois. 386
U.S. 300 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). As its very name implies, probable
cause involves probabilities, and the information known to the officer need not be sufficient to establish guilt. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). Magistrates issuing arrest warrants are similarly obligated to
determine whether the officer's affidavit alleges facts sufficient upon which to base a finding of probable cause. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); FED. R. ClUM. P.
4(a).
52. Whitely, 401 U.S. at 567-68.
53. In acknowledging the propriety of the arresting officer's conduct, the court
warned that although police officers are entitled to assume that an arrest warrant taken out
by a fellow officer is supported by probable cause, "[w]here ... the contrary turns out to
be true, an otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of
the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest." Id at 568.
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without probable cause is void ab initio and any evidence seized thereunder must be suppressed. 54 The court found the rule in Whiteley to be
even more readily applicable to Mitchell's situation because there was no
factual basis of any kind for the arrest warrant issued by Greenwood
Village. 5 5
56
In continuing its analysis, the court distinguished Hill v. California.
In that case, probable cause existed for the issuance of the arrest warrant. The mere fact that the officers arrested another, thinking he was
Hill, could not defeat the validity of the underlying warrant. Finding
that it was reasonably probable that the person arrested was Hill, the
Court held the officers' actions to be constitutional and permitted the
evidence seized in the search to be used against Hill.5 7 The Mitchell
court concluded that Hill did not address the issue of the validity of an
arrest warrant which was not founded on probable cause, while Whiteey
addressed precisely that issue. 58 Accordingly, applying Whiteley, the
court found that Mitchell's arrest violated his constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
2.

Applicability of the Good Faith Statute

In ruling that Colorado's good faith statute 59 did not apply to the
facts in Mitchell, the court pointed out that it was merely applying the
statute as written and was not ruling on its constitutionality. 60 The good
faith statute is divided into good faith mistakes and technical violations
each of which was discussed separately by the court.
The court noted that the statutory definition of "good faith mistake"-an error in facts that if true would otherwise be probable causewas merely a redefinition of probable cause and would not operate to
change federal exclusionary rule law.6 1 There was no evidence, the
court concluded, that the arresting officer had relied on mistaken facts.
Rather, he had relied on a warrant that had been mistakenly issued. The
court ruled that a good faith mistake could not be found within the
meaning of the Colorado good faith statute without a showing of factual
62
error underlying the issuance of the warrant.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Mitchell, 678 P.2d at 992 n.2.
IA at 993.
401 U.S. 797 (1971).
Id. at 804.
Mitchell, 678 P.2d at 994.
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-3-308 (Supp. 1984).

60. 678 P.2d at 994-95.
61. Id at 995.
Noting that the statutory definition of good faith mistake includes "reasonable judgmental errors of fact made by an officer in applying for or in executing a warrant, or similar factual errors made by a court in issuing a warrant," the court found that, "[v]iewed in
this light, the statutory definition of 'good faith mistake' serves to make explicit what is
already implicit in federal exclusionary rule doctrine." Id (citation omitted).
62. The court noted that no evidence was presented at the suppression hearing concerning the reason the arrest warrant was mistakenly issued. Without such a "factual predicate" the court had no basis to find a "good faith mistake" on the part of the arresting
officer. The court, thus, at least suggests that its ruling might have been different if the
reasons behind the issuance of the arrest warrant were known. Id at 995-96.
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In concluding that there had been no technical violation, the court
relied in part on its conclusion that there were no facts to support a
finding of good faith mistake. Technical violation, as applicable to the
facts in Mitchell,63 is defined as "a reasonable good faith reliance upon
. . . a warrant which is later invalidated due to a good faith mistake
.... ,,64 Again, the court pointed out that there was no evidence that
the warrant had been issued in reliance on certain facts which later
proved to be false. Instead, the warrant failed because the evidence
showed that there had been no facts to justify its issuance. 65 In sum, the
majority concluded that the Colorado good faith statute would not permit the introduction of evidence seized during an arrest based on an
invalid arrest warrant.
B.

Dissenting Opinion

67
Justice Rovira's dissenting opinion 66 relied on Hill v. California
and on decisions by several state courts 68 for the proposition that, by
the existence of the warrant, whether issued erroneously or not, the officer in Mitchell had probable cause to make the arrest. 6 9 Although the
Court in Hill found that probable cause existed for the issuance of the
arrest warrant and that no fourth amendment violation had occurred,
Justice Rovira concluded that Hill was applicable to the facts of Mitchell.
He argued that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to Mitchell
because no deterrence would be achieved by doing so. 7 0 This position
is confusing because under Hill the arrest in Mitchell would not have violated the fourth amendment. Without a fourth amendment violation,
there is no need to apply the exclusionary rule and no need to determine whether deterrence would be achieved by its application.
The dissenting justice further argued that when other jurisdictions
were faced with facts similar to those in Mitchell, they found the initial

63. The definition of technical violation in section 16-3-308(2)(b) of the Colorado Revised Statutes includes a good faith reliance on a statute later ruled unconstitutional and a
good faith reliance on a court precedent later overturned, neither of which is applicable to
the situation in Mitchell. CoLo. Rav. STAT. § 16-3-308(2)(b) (Supp. 1984).
64. Id
65. The court concluded that:
Whatever the outer limit of the "technical violation" exception might be, we are
satisfied that it was not intended to encompass an arrest warrant that is totally
devoid of any factual support and comes into being only as the result of some
unexplained mistake on the part of the issuing court. The defect in such a warrant is a fundamental one, far beyond the purview of a "technical violation."
Mitchell, 678 P.2d at 996.
66. Id at 996 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
67. 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
68. Childress v. United States, 381 A.2d 614 (D.C. 1977); Patterson v. United States,
301 A.2d 67 (D.C. 1973); New Jersey v. Cross, 164 NJ. Super. 368, 396 A.2d 604 (1978);
People v. Lent, 105 Misc. 2d 831, 433 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1980), rev'd, 92 A.D.2d 941, 460
N.Y.S.2d 369 (1983); State v. Somfleth, 8 Or. App. 171, 492 P.2d 808 (1972); Commonwealth v. Riley, 284 Pa. Super. 280, 425 A.2d 813 (1981).
69. 678 P.2d at 997.
70. Id at 998. Essentially he argues that no deterrence would be achieved by applying
the exclusionary rule to Mitchell and that "the cost of applying the rule in a case such as
this would outweigh any deterrent effect it might achieve." Id (Rovira, J., dissenting).
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arrest to be supported by probable cause and, therefore, not a violation
of the fourth amendment. 7 1 Justice Rovira cited six state court cases in
which the information upon which the arrest was based later turned out
to be incorrect. In all six cases the state courts permitted introduction
of evidence seized in the course of the arrest. 72 However, there is a
critical distinction between those cases and the Mitchell case. In all but
one of those cases, the original arrest warrants or stolen car reports
were validly issued, but were rendered incorrect because of events which
74
followed their issuance. 73 In the remaining case, State v. Sorfieth,
75
based on reliable information and suspicious behavior by defendant,
the officers suspected the defendant of being involved in a recent narcotics burglary and, thus, approached him for questioning. 7 6 A routine
check showed that the defendant was absent without leave from the military service and he was detained on the basis of that information. 7 7 After a search at the station house in which illegal drugs were discovered
on the defendant, the AWOL report was found to be incorrect. 78 Because the Court in Somfleth held that the officers had probable cause to
arrest and search defendant based on the drug-related information and
observations, 7 9 that case is inapposite to the facts of Mitchell.
Justice Rovira concludes his dissent by indicating that he and the
majority view the exclusionary rule differently: while he favors a caseby-case analysis of whether the rule's deterrent effect would be achieved,
the majority, he believes, has adopted a per se approach.8 0 Because of
his differing approach to the exclusionary rule, Justice Rovira would find
that there was probable cause to arrest Mitchell. 8 '
71. Id. at 998-99.
72. Id. at 999-1000.
73. Childress v. United States, 381 A.2d 614 (D.C. 1977); People v. Lent, 105 Misc. 2d
831, 433 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1980) rev'd, 92 A.D.2d 941, 460 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1983); and Commonwealth v. Riley, 284 Pa. Super. 280, 425 A.2d 813 (1981), all involved arrest warrants
that were satisfied through actions of the defendants, but were not canceled on nationwide
information systems or other police records. In Riley and Childress the defendants were
arrested four days after the warrants should have been canceled and in Lent the delay was a
matter of nine hours. Patterson v. United States, 301 A.2d 67 (D.C. 1973) and NewJersey
v. Cross, 164 N.J. Super. 368, 396 A.2d 604 (1978) concerned stolen car reports which
were not canceled after the stolen cars at issue had been retrieved.
74. 8 Or. App. 171, 492 P.2d 808 (1972).
75. The officers observed defendant stomping a hypodermic needle into the pavement and noted his difficulty in locating his billfold and papers after being asked for identification. 492 P.2d at 809.
76. Id.
77. Id, at 809-10.
78. The facts as set forth in the opinion are unclear whether there was ever any basis
for the AWOL report or whether defendant had already dealt with the military authorities
on the AWOL question. Id. at 810.
79. Id. at 811. When the officers asked defendant to get out of his car, they additionally noted that he exhibited signs of being under the influence of alcohol and in possession
of narcotics. Defendant's walk was uncertain, his speech was slurred and incoherent, and
although he claimed to have been drinking heavily, the officers could not detect any sign of
alcohol. Id.
80. Mitchell, 678 P.2d at 1000.
81. Justice Rovira failed to make the important distinction between whether a fourth
amendment violation had occurred, and whether a particular fourth amendment violation
is entitled to the sanction of the exclusionary rule.
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IV.

ANALYSIS

It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when the demise of the exclusionary
rule began, but there can be no doubt that the exclusionary rule is no
longer the stronghold of fourth amendment guarantees that it was at the
time of Mapp v. Ohio. 8 2 This is clearly illustrated in the state and dissent
arguments in Mitchell.83 The state argued that a search pursuant to an
arrest, which blatantly violated one of defendant's constitutional
rights, 8 4 should be upheld because the police officer could not have
known the arrest warrant was invalid and, thus, acted in good faith.
Despite Justice Rovira's dissenting opinion, the court could not
have reached any other conclusion under the facts in Mitchell. At the
time of the Mitchell opinion, the United States Supreme Court had not
adopted a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule and, thus, the
Colorado court's analysis was limited to the applicability of the good
faith statute.8 5 In order for the statute to survive constitutional scrutiny, 86 it could not diminish fourth amendment rights8 7 by dispensing
with the requirement of probable cause. That, in effect, would be the
result of denying the remedy of suppression to one whose privacy was
unreasonably invaded by an arrest and search unsupported by probable
cause. 88 Accordingly, the court correctly limited the Colorado statute to
those situations already excepted from application of the exclusionary
rule.89

A.

Probable Cause

Those who disagree with the majority opinion in Mitchell ignore the
fact that there was no factual basis for the arrest warrant issued by
Greenwood Village, and that, therefore, the arrest warrant was unsupported by probable cause. Without probable cause, an arrest warrant
cannot survive fourth amendment scrutiny. Neither the courts nor the
legislature can cure a constitutionally defective arrest warrant.
82. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
83. 678 P.2d 990 (Colo. 1984).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 7. Because Colorado's constitutional provision is identical to the fourth amendment, and the decision in Mitchell concerned both constitutional provisions, this section will only refer to the fourth amendment.
85. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-308 (Supp. 1984).
86. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
87. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 61 (1968) ("The question in this Court upon
review of a state-approved search or seizure 'is not whether the search [or seizure] was
authorized by state law. The question is rather whether the search was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.' ") (quoting Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967)).
88. The Bill of Rights developed as a system of protecting the minority from certain
abuses of the majority. The cost-benefit analysis used with the exclusionary rule ignores
the fact that constitutional rights are granted irrespective of the cost to society. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 353 (1974); see also
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (the fourth amendment relies on the exclusionary remedy for its
legitimacy).
89. For the proposition that the Colorado statute merely redefines probable cause
since probable cause is not concerned with truth but reasonable appearances, see Note,
The Colorado Statutory Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: A Step Too Far?, 53 U.
COLO. L. REv. 809, 816-17 (1982).
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As the Colorado court correctly pointed out, the distinguishing feature between Whitely v. Warden,90 a case in which the Court suppressed
the evidence, and Hill v. California,91 in which the Court admitted the
evidence, was the existence of probable cause in the issuance of the
arrest warrant. 92 In Hill, despite the arresting officer's mistake in identifying his suspect, the fact remained that there was probable cause for the
issuance of the arrest warrant in Hill's name. The underlying validity of
the warrant was not altered when the officer made an error in executing
the arrest. The fourth amendment's requirement that one be protected
from unreasonable seizures of his person, except for probable cause,
was met when an arrest warrant for Hill was obtained by establishing
probable cause to the satisfaction of the issuing magistrate and subsequent reviewing courts.
Whiteley presented the opposite circumstance: the facts underlying
the warrant were insufficient to constitute probable cause, but the arresting officer made no error in the execution thereof. However, the
constitutionality of searches and seizures within the fourth amendment
is determined by an analysis of the facts known at the time of the search;
subsequent events cannot cure an otherwise defective warrant. 93 Thus,
the Court excluded evidence that had been seized from Whiteley without probable cause and similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court excluded the evidence that had been seized from Mitchell.9
B.

The Exclusionary Rule as a ConstitutionalRequirement

Once the Mitchell court acknowledged the fourth amendment violation, it was required to apply the remedy for such violations first announced in Mapp: exclusion of all wrongfully seized evidence. As the
Court in Mapp aptly pointed out, the exclusionary rule, although not
expressly provided for by the Constitution, is nonetheless a constitutionally required remedy for fourth amendment violations. 9 5 This view
90. 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
91. 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
92. Mitchell, 678 P.2d at 994.
93. See United States v.Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1657 (1984) and cases cited therein
at note 9.
94. Justice Rovira exhibits his misunderstanding of the essential issue in Mitchell by
opting to apply Hill rather than Whiteley to the fourth amendment question. At no point in
his dissent is it acknowledged that the arrest warrant for Mitchell was unsupported by
probable cause as was the case in Whiteley. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. This
misapplication is made all the more glaring after careful analysis of the state court cases
used by Rovira to support his argument that no fourth amendment violation occurred in
Mitchell. In all but one of the cases, probable cause existed for the issuance of the documents upon which the arrests were based. In the one case in which the arrest document
was not founded on probable cause, the court cited other factors which constituted probable cause for the arrest. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
95. In discussing the origins of the exclusionary rule, the Court in Mapp noted that:
This Court has ever since required of federal law officers a strict adherence to
that command which this Court has held to be a clear, specific, and constitutionally required--even if judicially implied-deterrent safeguard without insistence
upon which the Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to a "form of
words."
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648.
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of the exclusionary rule as a constitutionally required remedy is not an
aberration of the Mapp decision, but is the interpretation given the ex96
clusionary rule by many constitutional scholars.
The issue of whether the exclusionary rule is constitutionally required depends on whether other adequate remedies exist for fourth
amendment violations. 97 While the Mapp Court concluded that other
remedies did not exist, 98 today's courts must believe there are other
means of remedying the fourth amendment wrong. 9 9 However, an analysis of the alternatives to the exclusionary rule reveals that which the
rule's critics can only deny: there are no other adequate remedies for
fourth amendment violations.
C.

Alternative Remedies

A damage suit in tort against the individual police officer and his
employer, the city, is one remedy often proposed. 100 The disadvantages
of the damage suit reveal its inadequacy: (1) much of the harm suffered
by the tort victim is immeasurable in monetary terms;' 0 1 (2) the police
may be immobilized through fear of ruinous civil damage judgments;
(3) many officers will be judgment proof; and (4) to collect a judgment
against the city, the plaintiff is required to show that the violation was a
02
result of the city's official policy.'
A suit seeking an injunction is even less satisfactory as a remedial
device, primarily because the case law has placed a nearly impossible
burden of proof on the plaintiff. In Rizzo v. Goode,'0 3 the Court held that
one must show that widespread constitutional violations result from a
policy of the government agency against which the injunction is sought.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3430 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stewart, supra note 23. For a constitutional interpretation of Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914), see Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a
ConstitutionalRequirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251, 295-307 (1974).
97. Stewart, supra note 23, at 1384.
98. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 652-53.
99. One of the more respected critics of the exclusionary rule contends that alternative remedies must be found because "[i]t would be intolerable if the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure could be violated without practical consequence." Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 665, 756 (1970).
100. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Katz, The
Jurisprudenceof Remedies: ConstitutionalLegality and The Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 8-33 (1968); Stewart, supra note 23, at 1398.
One commentator has proposed that Congress establish a joint liability plan by statute whereby one whose fourth amendment rights are violated by the police would be entited to compensation in a fixed amount plus an additional amount for actual damages. If
the police violation were intentional, reckless, or grossly negligent, the police officer
would be liable for payment of the entire amount, as well as subject to administrative
sanctions. Levin, An Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule for Fourth Amendment Violations, 58
JUDICATURE 74 (1974).

101. Stewart, supra note 23, at 1398.
102. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-56 (1980). For a general
discussion of the inadequacies of the tort remedy, see Ingber, supra note 14, at 1540-41
and Schroeder, Detering Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69
GEO. LJ. 1361, 1386-96 (1981).
103. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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Moreover, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 10 4 established a requirement that
essentially forecloses all injunction actions against offending police departments. In Lyons, the Court held that a plaintiff must show he is likely
to be injured in the future by the police department's practices. 10 5
A more drastic and therefore less acceptable remedy is criminal
prosecution of the individual officer. 10 6 However, no one wants to punish officers who are working to protect society from crime by declaring
that they are criminals. 10 7 Moreover, in Screws v. United States, 108 the
Court held that only willful violations of constitutional rights were
actionable.
Informal remedies such as internal administrative review and civilian review boards are equally ineffective. It is doubtful that an internal
police review board would be willing to sanction one of its own for doing what any other officer might have done.' 0 9 Citizen review boards
would be difficult to establish and maintain primarily because of police
resistance to review by outsiders. 10
In sum, the exclusionary rule, despite its deficiencies,"" is the only
remedy for fourth amendment violations that balances desirable crime
enforcement techniques" 12 with the individual's right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.' 13 As the only adequate remedy
for fourth amendment violations, the exclusionary rules must be seen as
an inseparable element of the fourth amendment, and not as just another remedy to be separated from the right.
D.

The Good Faith Exception
Because the exclusionary rule is a constitutionally required remedy,

104. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
105. Id at 102.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982) provides that it is a crime for anyone acting under color of
law to deprive a person of his constitutional rights.
107. See Note, GrievanceResponse Mechanismsfor Police Misconduct, 55 VA. L. REv. 909, 928
(1969).
108. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
109. For a detailed exploration of the problems inherent in police review boards, see
Schroeder, supra note 102, at 1401-07. One commentator has proposed that the invocation of the exclusionary rule be tied to police department programs aimed at reducing
fourth amendment violations. The more aggressive an officer's police department is in
punishing and deterring fourth amendment violations, the more likely the court would
admit the illegally seized evidence. Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 SwTN. L.
Rv. 1027, 1050-55 (1974).
110. Note, supra note 107, at 943. For a discussion of citizen review boards, see Hudson, Police Review Boards and Police Accountability, 36 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 515 (1971).
111. For various criticisms of the exclusionary rule, see Ingber, supra note 14, at 151921; Jensen & Hart, supra note 15, at 921-29; Comment, The Evolution and Confusion of Exclusion: Does "Good Faith" Make Good Sense Under the FourthAmendment?, 4 DET. C.L. REV. 1587,
1602-06 (1983).
112. Remedies more effective at deterring fourth amendment violations would severely
restrict the police's ability to fight crime. See Ingber, supra note 14, at 1555-56; Stewart,
supra note 23, at 1388-89.
113. Justice Murphy warned that "[a]lteratives are deceptive. Their very statement
conveys the impression that one possibility is as effective as the next. In this case their
statement is blinding. For there is but one alternative to the rule of exclusion. That is no
sanction at all." Woy', 338 U.S. at 41 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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the good faith exception, which would permit certain fourth amendment
violations to go unremedied, presents a significant reduction of individual fourth amendment rights. The unfairness of applying the good faith
exception to the facts in Mitchell 14 magnifies that which is fundamentally wrong with the good faith exception. By framing the issue in terms
of denying a remedy, the courts have succeeded in limiting fourth
amendment guarantees without addressing that limitation. It is the
fourth amendment standard of probable cause that declares a police officer's good faith actions to be unreasonable and thus violative of the
fourth amendment. Denying a remedy to the victim because the officer
acted in good faith allows the court to find that no constitutional right
was violated" 5 without having to address openly the fourth amendment
issue. 116
As society becomes increasingly concerned with the rising crime
rate, it may be willing to sacrifice some individual privacy guarantees for
greater police protection. That issue must, however, be addressed on its
merits and in the context of reducing the level of probable cause required by the fourth amendment for searches and seizures. We must
not allow so fundamental an issue to be decided unwittingly. The good
faith exception is more than another exception to a fourth amendment
remedy; it represents a potentially significant reduction in fourth
amendment guarantees.
CONCLUSION

Under then-existing fourth amendment doctrine, the Colorado
Supreme Court correctly affirmed the suppression of evidence in People
v. Mitchell. Now that fourth amendment guarantees have been radically
114. In contrast to the situation in Leon, where two judges merely differed on whether
probable cause existed and the reviewing court determined that the search warrant was
based on insufficient probable cause, in Mitchell, there were no facts supporting issuance of
the arrest warrant. In fact, the Court in Leon strongly implies that the rule of Whiteley
would remain unchanged under its newly announced good faith rule. Officers who rely on
a warrant issued on another officer's affidavit and are ignorant of the warrant's underlying
basis are not entitled to the protection of the good faith exception. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at
3421 n.24.
115. Justice Stevens' dissent in Leon points out the paradox of disallowing a remedy for
a violation of the fourth amendment because the court determines that the violation was
reasonable. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3446-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. Until the decision in Leon, it was well settled that mere good faith on the part of
the officer did not constitute the level of probable cause required by the fourth amendment. E.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959);
Director General of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25 (1923). Although the Leon
Court did not acknowledge that its decision will probably result in reducing the level of
probable cause, that is the practical effect of its recognition of a good faith exception. It
now appears that good faith will constitute probable cause. Unwittingly, Justice Rovira, in
his dissenting opinion, makes the connection between the exclusionary rule and the fourth
amendment which most exclusionary rule critics attempt to avoid, but which is the necessary result of the good faith exception. In essence, he argued that no fourth amendment
violation occurred because deterrence would not be furthered by application of the exclusionary rule. Justice Rovira would seemingly limit the requirement of probable cause to
those situations where the exclusion remedy would deter future fourth amendment violations. Mitchell, 678 P.2d at 997-98 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
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altered by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, the
Colorado courts must be persuaded to deny recognition to the good
faith exception as announced in that decision. Adoption of such an exception not only denies a remedy for acknowledged fourth amendment
violations, it confuses fourth amendment analysis by dealing with what
are essentially fourth amendment problems in the less controversial
context of reducing the availability of the exclusionary remedy.
Denise W Kennedy

